Economic Consequences of Terrorism in Nigeria: Implications for National Development CUM National Security

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Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of terrorism on national security and development in Nigeria. This is on the stance that terrorism has not only undermined national security but has unavoidably hampered meaningful development in Nigeria by violating human rights, displacing residents, discouraging trade and investment; local and foreign, threatening livelihood, and amplifying casualties. The paper contends that terrorism is a global phenomenon from which Africa is not immune and Nigeria not insusceptible. The paper, which adopted a qualitative and exploratory approach and relied on descriptive analysis of secondary sources, demonstrated that having adequate knowledge of the phenomenon is key in fashioning assuasive measures just as understanding the consequences is instrumental to forging a way out. The paper further appraised the causes of terrorism in Nigeria and identified the factors– ethnic and religious identity, exclusionary character of the state, and lack of political will among others, which have fueled protraction of the insidious trend. The paper thus advocates for a strong commitment to counter-terrorism strategies, adoption of The Meghalaya Model, Youth Empowerment, Institutional as well as Capacity building as the way forward.

Keywords: Terrorism, National Development, National Security, Meghalaya, Underdevelopment

Introduction

Until recently, the threat of upscale terrorism seems relatively alien to the continent of Africa. In spite of the various clashes, ethnic and religious crises, riots, genocidal wars, ethnic cleansing and even militia attacks that has overwhelmed the continent, it remained unconceivable and unpredictable that the docile people of Africa can at any point in time take to suicide bombing for ideological and philosophical reasons. As a matter of fact, before the blowing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks in 2001, otherwise known as "9/11 attacks"- which marked a distinct level of unsurpassed terrorist activity against various nationals housed by the then second largest building in the world, upscale terrorism has been elusive in Africa. However, recent developments have shown a revolutionary pattern in warfare coupled with proliferation of arms as a result of pre and post-electoral violence ignited by other factors such as primordial identity, ideology and social alienation. It is unarguably true that terrorism constitutes a bane in the wheel of development in Africa especially with the loss of manpower and economic resources, internal displacement, and above all, entrenchment of disunity. Whether socially, economically or politically, terrorism uproots the seeds of development sown in an area and thwarts whatever little progresses already made, truly, terrorism de-consolidates democratic gains. Of a truth, terrorism a global phenomenon, is a major challenge to world leaders and has further exacerbated volatility of hitherto weak, fragile, failing, or failed states. This is because terrorism is not peculiar to Africa i.e. Nigeria, but transcends shores, regions and continents. Indeed, the cankerous evolution remains a worldwide phenomenon providing a common ground for world leaders to team up and beef up security in their various countries and boundaries.

When the infamous terrorist, Osama bin Laden singled out the United Nations and various world leaders as potential targets of terrorism in a videotaped message in November 2001, he made clear his conviction that all free nations pose a threat to the Islamic world -thus casting the issue of terrorism into an unprecedented global context.

Apart from Al Qaeda-related terrorist ativities, which exists on a sophisticated international level, many other terrorist groups exists around the world. These groups are frequently concerned with domestic issues, acting in opposition to the established government. In his November 10, 2001 speech to the United Nations, President George W. Bush framed the issue of terrorism in its broadest possible context by stating that every UN member country was a potential target of terrorism. Indeed, the Bush administration often stated in the aftermath of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks that every democracy in the world is a target for extremist groups. "This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world," Bush said (Misiroglu, 2003: 262). Because every UN member nation is a potential victim, every UN member nation has a responsibility to crack down on terrorist financing within its borders, to share intelligence information with one another, and to coordinate law enforcement activities.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in world history in that it has existed in every age for several centuries. Historically, the following examples of important terrorist groups can be identified: Baader Mainhof gang of West Germany, the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigade, the Palestinian al Fatah, Israeli Haganah, Lebanese Hezbollah, Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the Viet Cong in Vietnam, Somalian al Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), to mention but a few prominent ones (Ngare, 2012). As opined by Udama (2013), incontrovertibly, terrorism in the world at large has risen to a sublime and the global community in a bid to stave-off this act which has constituted a threat to global peace and stability unanimously agreed to counter terrorism in all its forms and to also bring its perpetrators to justice. Terrorism is an insidious act common and conducted daily over decades and has been responsible for the physical and or structural violence experienced by many people in Nigeria. The increase in the circulation, use and transfer of sophisticated weaponry and the consequences for violence, increased mass casualties and perennial violence in Nigeria, this past years have spirited scholarly efforts towards identifying the underlying causes, proffering solutions and curtailing futuristic tendencies of terrorism in Africa- particularly Nigeria.

By adopting a qualitative and exploratory approach, this paper seeks to draw insights from scholarly exegesis and empirical historical evidence by way of descriptive analysis of secondary sources. For convenience, the thrust of analysis in this paper is sequentially reviewed under a number of successive themes and sub-themes, carefully designed to actualize the paper's derived assumption to wit: terrorism in Nigeria is a threat to national security and a recipe for underdevelopment.

Conceptualizing Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is widely interrogated in this paper. Etymologically, terrorism comes from Latin and French words: *terrere*, and *terrorisme*, meaning "to frighten," and "state rule by terror*"* respectively. Just as there is no universally accepted *modus operandi* of terrorists, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. In fact it has been said that "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Misiroglu (2003:255), quoting the US Vice President Task Force on Terrorism defined it as "the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups, or to modify their behaviour or politics." The author further quoted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defining terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

According to Stepanova (2008), terrorism is the form of violence that most closely integrates one-sided violence against civilians with asymmetrical violent confrontation against a stronger opponent, be it a state or a group of states. Terrorism is defined by Sampson and Onuoha (2011) as "the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts". According to Barga (2012:1), terrorism is an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by semi clandestine individuals, groups or state actors for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons. Barga (2012:2) further opine that terrorism is also ineluctably about power, the acquisition of power and the use of power to achieve political change at all cost. Terrorism is thus the actual or threatened use of violence in an attempt to advance a politically motivated end.

As noted by Okeke (2005) and Nacos, (2006), certain basic attributes of terrorism include the fact that it is driven by motives or objectives, which in the long-run are political despite the fact that the perpetrators may be guided by religious beliefs, even though the lines between politics and religion may be thin at the initial stages; the targets are largely civilians or non-combatants or members of certain religious or ethnic groups; actors are predominantly non-state actors but sometimes supported by state actors with interests to protect; and methodology is critically the use of violence such as shootings, suicide bombings, kidnappings and hostage taking in order to spread fear.

Sani (cited by Okoli and Iortyer, 2014) observes: Terrorism is the aggression unjustly carried out by individuals, groups or states against human beings. It includes forms of unjustly terrifying, harming, threatening, and killing of people and banditry. It also includes any violent act or threat carried out as part of individual or collective criminal plan aimed at terrifying or harming people or endangering their lives, freedom or security. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) (cited by Majekodunmi, 2015) highlights four key elements of terrorism:

1) It is premeditated - planned in advance, rather than an impulsive act of rage.
2) It is political - not criminal, like the violence that groups such as the mafia use to get money, but designed to change the existing political order.
3) It is aimed at civilians - not at military targets or combat-ready troops.
4) It is carried out by sub-national groups—not by the army of a country.

I must also make bold to add that the targets of terrorist activities includes but is not limited to: transportation facilities, attack against utilities or other public services, or an incident involving chemical or biological agents.

As submitted by Okoli and Iortyer, (2014), Terrorism thrives on 'hit-and-run combatancy'. This is typified by surprised aggression, brutal militancy and clandestinism. In terms of specific strategies, terrorists globally have adopted the following as means of executing their diabolical designs:

1. arson
2. mass killing by gunfire
3. suicide bombing
4. use of improvised explosives
5. high-jacking of aircraft, ship, etc
6. hostage-taking (kidnapping)
7. media propaganda and advocacy
8. piracy
9. jail break
10. forced enlistment/recruitment of combatant, etc.

These appraised definitions and many others show a common denominator of politically motivated behaviour, while also taking into account that an increasing number of extremist acts are carried out in the name of religious or cultural causes.

There are various typologies of terrorism. Misiroglu (2003) categorized terrorism as domestic and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism involves groups of individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of a government or population without foreign direction. International terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the host countries or whose activities transcend national boundaries. According to the author, a terrorist attack can take several forms, depending on the technological means available to the terrorist, the nature of the political issue motivating the attack, and the points of weakness of the terrorist's target. On the other hand, Shultz (cited by Majekodunmi, 2015) divides terrorism into three generalized categories: Revolutionary Terrorism, Sub-revolutionary Terrorism and Repressive Terrorism. Revolutionary Terrorism is aimed at "bringing about political revolution"; Sub-revolutionary Terrorism "is employed for political motives other than revolution". While Repressive Terrorism is government directed terror aimed at "restraining certain groups, individuals, or forms of behaviours deemed to be undesirable. While, Okolu and Iortyer (2014) categorized it into:

a. Rebel/Militia Groups i.e. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); The M23 in Congo, DRC
b. Islamist Insurgents i.e. Al Qaeda; Al Shabaab (Somalia); Boko Haram (Nigeria)
c. Political Movements i.e. Taliban (Afghanistan); Hamas (Palestine)
d. Government Agents i.e. Janjaweed of Sudan
e. Clandestine Organizations i.e. Violent cults and underworld organization

Anatomy of the Crisis: Nature of Terrorism in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the profile of terrorism have become inflated as the incidents of sporadic and habitual attacks have increased especially as perpetuated by Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria which has left scores of death in its wake. As noted by Okolu and Iortyer (2014), In terms of observed incidence and prevalence, the North-East Geo-political zone of Nigeria has been worst hit by the Boko Haram insurgency. With the exception of Jigawa State, this Geo-political zone has been most prone and most vulnerable to various scales of terrorist attacks, with States like Borno, Yobe and Kano as critical flash points. Elsewhere in parts of the North-East and North central zones, the activities of the insurgents have also been pronounced. Obene (2012) argues that the killing of Mr. Dele Giwa, by a 'Letter Bomb' in October 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Nigeria. Subsequently, the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy hijacked a Nigeria Airways aircraft in October 1993 following the annulment of Chief M.K.O. Abiola's presidential election. After this, a vicious bomb blast ripped Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium in August 1994. Several other incidents have occurred since then. For instance between 1996 and 1998 there was bomb attack on the car of the then Chief Security Officer of Federal Aviation Authority of Nigeria, Dr Omoshola. Subsequently, the escort car of the former Military Administrator of Lagos State, Brig Gen MB Marwa (Rtd) was attacked.

Other notable acts of terrorism in Nigeria can be summarized as follows: General sectarian violence in Jos (2004, 2010, and 2011). Series of bombings and killings in Maiduguri (since 2004 to date). The 2010 New Year's Eve bombing of Mogadishu Military Cantonment Mammy Market Abuja. The May 29 2010 Presidential Inauguration bombing in Abuja. The 1st October 2010 bombing in Abuja that disorganized the marking of Nigeria's 50th Independence Anniversary. The Mammy Market bombings in Bauchi, and Zuba near Abuja in 2011. Post-April 2011 Presidential Election violence in the Northern parts of Nigeria. April 8, 2011 Suleja INEC office bombing. May 29, 2011 bombing of social drinking sports in Maiduguri and Zuba an outskirts of Abuja. June 16, 2011 Nigeria Police Force Headquarters bombing in Abuja . August 26, 2011 bombing of UN House in Abuja. Nov 4, 2011 bombing of Army Task Force Operational, Police Headquarters and other government buildings in Damaturu, Yobe State and Maiduguri in Borno State. Christmas day bombing at St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla near Abuja (25 December 2011). Mubi, Yola, Gombe and Maiduguri bombings (5-6 January 2012). Kano bombings (20 January and 1 February 2012). HQ 1 Division Nigerian Army and Kawo bridge bombings in Kaduna (7 February 2012) (Omale, 2013).

Since 2009 Boko Haram has become a metaphor for insecurity in Nigeria after the government launched a clampdown on the group, which resulted in some 800 deaths, mostly of the sect members (Laremont, 2012). Mohamed Yusuf, the group's leader, was killed in that attack while in police custody. In what was apparently retaliation for the extra judicial killing of its leader, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January 2010, at Dala Alemderi Ward in Maiduguri metropolis, Borno State, which resulted in the deaths of four people. Since then the sect has intensified its terrorist activities. Though Boko Haram has dominated the security discourse in Nigeria since early 2010, nearly everything about the sect still remains contested – from the meaning of its name to the reasons for its emergence and radicalization, and whether it is now affiliated to foreign terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It is also contestable whether the group is actually responsible for all the numerous terrorist atrocities attributed to it (Adibe, 2013). It is believed that members of Boko Haram actually prefer to be known by their Arabic name – Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad – meaning 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'. In the town of Maiduguri, North-Eastern Nigeria, where the group was believed to have been formed, the residents call them 'Boko Haram' – a combination of the Hausa word 'boko' meaning 'Western education' and the Arabic word 'Haram' which figuratively means 'sin' and literally means 'forbidden'. Boko Haram has therefore been commonly translated as 'Western education is sacrilege' or 'Western education is a sin'. Some, such as Ioannis Mantzikos, have, however, suggested that such a translation will be more a transliteration of the two words and that what the users of the expression meant to convey was that 'Western Civilization is forbidden' rather than that 'Western education' is forbidden' or a sacrilege because what the group is opposed to really is Western civilization – which includes of course Western education, but is not limited to it (Mantzikos, 2010).

Commenting on the origin of the group, Madike (2011) noted that just as there are contestations over the name of the sect or the meaning of Boko Haram, there are also controversies over the origin of the group. The popular belief is that it was founded around 2001 or 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf.

This belief has however been challenged by Isioma Madike who contends that the sect was actually started in 1995 as Sahaba and was initially led by one Lawan Abubakar who later left for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Whatever may be the truth about the origin of the sect, what is not in dispute is that Yusuf was responsible for raising its profile. He was in fact said to have established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from Nigeria and the neighbouring countries enrolled their children. In 2009, the police clamped down on the sect members who were ignoring a law requiring motorcyclists to wear crash helmets. That sparked a furious backlash. Police stations and government offices in Borno were burned to the ground, and hundreds of criminals released in a prison break, as the violence spread across Northern Nigeria. The government and army reacted with force; Yusuf was captured and shot dead in police custody. Five days of fighting left some 800 people dead. The battle between security forces and followers of the Boko Haram sect came to an end with the killing of the leader of the group few hours after he was captured in Maiduguri.

The police claimed that Mallam Mohamed Yusuf whose followers battled troops and policemen for five days in many state, was reportedly killed in a shootout with security men, but a BBC reporter in Maiduguri said Yusuf was arrested and paraded before journalist with apparent signs of injuries, ―he has been killed, you can come and see his body at the state police command headquarters. A journalist said the body outside the state police headquarters had several gunshot wounds. It was learnt that before he was killed, Yusuf requested that people should pray for him to have the mercy of God. Violence linked to the Boko haram insurgency has resulted in an estimated 10, 000 deaths between 2001 and 2013. Expectedly, being a diehard sect after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the group carried out its first attack in Borno in January 2011. The attack resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of frequency, intensity and sophistication, as well as casualties. In January 2012, Abubakar Shekau, a former deputy to Yusuf, appeared on YouTube announcing his assumption of control of the jihadist Islamist extremist group Boko haram after the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Akinfala, Akinbode and Kemmer, 2014).

According to Akinfala et. al. (2014), some of the fundamental argument of beliefs held by the group is that banking, taxation and jurisprudence in the country are completely infidel submitting to these void the entire faith of a true Muslim, they also argue that western education was unislamic as it embodies all that Islam projected, while it propagates the negative of what Allah and his prophet had ordained. For instance, the mixing of boys and girls under the same shade, the propagation of the theory that men evolved from the family of monkey as well as the sun in the sky is static. According to them, all these are in conflict with the direct words of Allah who said Muslims must not mix sexes under the same umbrella and that he created men from clay as well as the sun, earth and the moon each move on its own axis. They further argue that today's banking system is shylock and Islam forbids interest in financial transaction, just as the laws of the land are man-made, in replacement for the ones ordained by Allah. It was on their bid to run away from all of these vices that members of the sect decided to cluster themselves in strategic location in the outskirt of most major town of Bauchi and Yobe. Akinfala et. al. maintain that late Sheikh Muhammed Yusuf, took advantage of the poor quality of Nigeria educational system, the incessant strike, cult activities, widespread malpractices and prostitution that is made worse with no offer of job after graduation to lure many youths to abandoned schools and embrace Yusuf's new and emerging state that promises to offer them a better education. Late Yusuf also took advantage of the irresponsible leadership at all levels of government, unemployment, poverty, corruption and insecurity.

According to Forest (2012), the major grievances of the group are:

a. Religious insecurities – Being a Muslim in Nigeria used to bring power and prestige
b. Political insecurities – Politicized religious and ethnic identity, Conspiracy theories driven by fear and reinforced by a heavy-handed security response to protests
c. Economic insecurities – Socio-economic isolation
He further identified the following as the strategies adopted by the group:
• Provoke sectarian violence
• Provoke heavy-handed
• Mobilize Nigerian Muslims to revolt against status quo
• Media strategy
• Suicide bombings
• Conflicting Factions

Propelling Factors: Causes of Terrorism in Nigeria

Bloom (2007) enumerated the following as root causes of terrorism among others:

• Lack of rule of law.
• Failed or weak states that provide havens for terrorists.
• Corrupt government
• Poverty
• Depression
• Absence of good governance and leadership
• Discrimination
• Ignorance
• Social injustice
• In addition to the above are unemployment, absolute poverty, identity and fault lines, ideology, underemployment, rise of indigenous neo-elites, executive lawlessness, marginalization, human rights violation, frustration, relative deprivation, oppression, neo-imperialist class, proliferation of weapons, do or die politics and government insincerity and insensitivity.

Akanji (2007:63) argues that it is "corrupt and ineffectual political leadership that often engenders poverty and, consequently, violent activities". The implication is that government inactions precipitate violent acts. As long as government continues to distance the masses from their land and appropriate their rights without due process, government cannot be seen to be egalitarian as it does not take into consideration the principles of corporate governance, which involves freedom of choice, rule of law, transparency, justice and accountability. The war against terrorism cannot be fought when the generality of the citizens are living below poverty level. In this era, where there is "free-lance terrorist" (soldiers of unemployed youths, who do not belong to any fundamentalist or radical group but who are easy tools in the hands of the rich or terrorist organizations) by just a mere financial inducement, they can carry out any terrorist act. These youths are easily available for criminal acts because they have nothing doing and nobody cares about their wellbeing. Government only make political and economic promises in order to secure a win, but after they have won; promises are abandoned only to recycle the promise in the next election because they must win their votes. This is the Nigerian dilemma. This is the critical meeting point that has enhanced the emergence and growth of militancy and terror groups in Nigeria (Chinwokwu, 2013).

Aside from the perceived causes of terrorism in Nigeria, it is worthy of note that certain propelling factors have led to the protraction of terrorism in Nigeria. These factors have been explained by scholars as:

Ethnic and Religious Identity

According to Solomon (2013), academics stress the religious identity of Boko Haram – its strong Wahhabist Islamist identity, for instance. Such a view could be supported by much historical evidence. Indeed, historical precedents to Boko Haram go all the way back to 1802 when Uthman dan Fodio , a religious teacher and ethnic Fulani herder, declared his jihad to purify Islam – in the process establishing the Sokoto caliphate which exists to this day. More recently the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano, 1982 in Kaduna and Bulumkutu, 1984 in Yola and 1985 in Bauchi, represent an effort to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian state in much the same way that Boko Haram is attempting to force Abuja to accept sharia law across all 36 states of the Nigerian polity. Between 1999 and 2008, 28 religious conflicts were reported – the most prominent being the recurrent violence between Muslims and Christians in Jos in 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2008. Further citing Ikelegbe, Solomon stressed that ethnic, communal, religious, regional and sectarian identities are on the rise in Nigeria since they provide a safe haven for increasing numbers of people fleeing an incompetent, insensitive and, at times, predatory state. The antipathy with which Nigerians view the state and the concomitant trust with which they view religious leaders is seen in a Pew Global Attitudes Project. Asked if religious leaders should play a role in politics, a staggering 91 percent in Nigeria agreed with the statement. This was the highest of all the countries surveyed, noted Solomon (2013).

The ethnicization and politicization of the discourse on Boko Haram is also another factor militating against the government's anti-terror efforts. It is useful to mention at this juncture that the multi-ethnic character of the Nigerian state manifests in all aspects of its life. The discourse on Boko Haram has undoubtedly become another ethnic issue in the country.

It is noteworthy that the Boko Haram crisis, coincidentally, became fiercer and popular at a time when there was intense mutual suspicion and tension between the Northern and Southern elites over the issue of rotation of state power. The Northern elites saw themselves being shortchanged in a certain 'zoning formula' after the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan as the president following the sudden death of Umar Musa Yar'Adua. Given this, the general belief in the South – the origin of President Jonathan – is that Boko Haram is politically motivated, and an outcome of the general grievance from Northern Nigeria. On the other hand, this belief has also fueled a continuous distrust in the North about the sincerity of the Jonathan-led government's effort to counter Boko Haram (Onapajo, 2013).

Exclusionary Character of the Nigerian State

Solomon (2013) opined that the antipathy towards the state is made worse by the exclusionary character of the Nigerian post-colonial Nigerian state which is designed to accentuate and not attenuate differences. For instance, local and state governments are clearly exclusionary in how they differentially confer rights on people living in respective jurisdictions. At local government level, for example, there is a marked distinction between 'natives' or 'indigenes' who share the same ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic characteristics and who are termed 'local citizens' and 'immigrants' or 'settlers' who are considered to be 'non-citizens' who share different ethnic, cultural, religious, or linguistic characteristics from the 'locals' irrespective of how long they have resided in a particular area and the fact that they are all Nigerian citizens. Indeed until three years ago, 'indigeneity' was a criterion for qualification to contest in local elections, and not residency – irrespective of whether you lived your entire life in that locality. The consequences of the exclusionary nature of the politics of the Nigerian state are clearly seen in narratives amongst ordinary Nigerians when explaining the violence. Religion, ethnic and regional identities all feature. Sadly, there is no articulation of a common Nigerian citizenship which effectively transcends these differences.

Insufficient Data and Intelligence

The insufficiency of intelligence on Boko Haram and others alike marks a critical point to start with. Clearly, the Nigerian government is still struggling to acquire adequate knowledge of its own enemies. Amazingly, few years after the emergence of the Boko Haram phenomenon, the Nigerian government perceived the group as faceless and unidentifiable. Former President Goodluck Jonathan during his official visit to Borno State (the stronghold of Boko Haram) in March 2013 still classified the group as a 'ghost'! Obviously, this explains the reason why the government was clueless on which particular group represents the authentic Boko Haram. In January 2013, a man believed in governmental circles to be the commander of the group, Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulazeez, claimed to have had a series of peace talks with the government and as a result declared a ceasefire on behalf of Boko Haram (Al Jazeera, 2013).

Lack of Political Will

The political will to fight Boko Haram is also suspect. In January 2012, then President Goodluck Jonathan shockingly announced that 'some of them [sponsors and sympathizers of Boko Haram] are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary'. Given the increasing sophistication of the attacks of the group, one cannot agree less with President Jonathan that there are truly some Nigerian 'big men' that sponsor the operations of the group. However, the government has yet to publicly identify and prosecute the elites in governmental circles who have direct or indirect connections with Boko Haram. This is despite the fact that some Boko Haram members have mentioned some names within the circles of the Nigerian elite. Besides, it is equally unclear if justice would be done on a few politicians that have been arrested for their links with Boko Haram as a result of the corruption and hijacking of the Nigerian judiciary. In a similar vein, two people appointed on the amnesty committee – Datti Ahmad and Shehu Sanni – declined their appointments on the grounds that earlier reconciliatory efforts they facilitated were frustrated by the government. According to Ahmad, 'since it is the same government, I will not participate in a program which outcome will be mismanaged. They failed to work with what we mutually arrived at in the past, so I will not be part of this one' (Daily Trust, 2013).

Consequences of Terrorism in Nigeria: Implications for National Security and Economic Development

To aver that terrorism has far reaching implications for national security is to state the obvious. This is an aphorism considering the devastating effects of terrorism in Nigeria recently. Aside from creating an ambiance of desolation and displacement, it further exacerbates the spate of instability in such an area and threatens peaceful coexistence.

As noted by Okoli and Iortyer (2014), the resultant public security volatility in the region has been an impediment to trade and investment, peaceful co-existence and stability, as well as sustainable livelihood and development. This scenario has since complicated and accentuated the plight of the region as a developmentally challenged section of Nigeria. In respect of the implications of terrorism for the wider polity of Nigeria, it is to be noted that the Boko Haram insurgency has led to negative perception of Nigeria as an unsafe country by the wider world. This has damaged Nigeria's profile as a favourable international destination for investment, travel, tourism, scholarship, and migration. The implication of this is that Nigeria is gradually drifting into the status of an ostracized nation. This does not augur well for the sustenance of the country's national security. Furthermore, the extent of violence and destruction that has been associated with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been horrific. The advent of suicide bombing as a strategy for prosecuting terrorism by members of the sect has since signaled a new dimension to the national security challenge in Nigeria. To say the least, the rising incidence and prevalence of terrorist attacks in Nigeria have exposed the country to serious levels of humanitarian and territorial vulnerabilities. In the face of this situation, the sustenance of Nigeria national security is at best problematic. Aside from this, terrorism in Nigeria increases public insecurity, threatens livelihood, increases human right abuses, amplify population displacement and refugee debacle and swells human casualties/fatalities.

To be sure, desiring for development amidst terrorist attacks is illusory, as no real development can be attained in a war prone society characterized by incessant bombings and attacks, considering that Nigerian democracy is nascent and can be easily disrupted by unrest. Ali Mongono was quoted speaking to Sun Newspaper saying people no longer go out for their normal business in daytime and they cannot also sleep in the night. Yet people are hungry but they are afraid of going out to look for survival. So as not to be killed or bombed. But then, they are also weary of staying at home (Sun Newspaper, July 2, 2011). Going by the logic that no economic development could take place in an atmosphere of fear, anarchy and insecurity. It therefore implies that Boko Haram menace is a bane to economic development. Looking at it internationally, Boko Haram crisis has added to the fear of foreign investors that are in Nigeria. (Abony, 2009). In many of the attack-ridden areas, economic activities have come to a halt and this traumatic episode has affected mostly the petty traders who earn their meal on daily routine. Banking sector have equally suffered setback as some commercial banks were closed in some of these areas. More so, humongous amounts of money meant for development and provision of infrastructure -good roads, electricity and other vital amenities, have been diverted to security issues. Thus, while the country is striving towards capacity building, the Boko Haram menace (and recently the Niger Delta militant groups) is crumbling such efforts.

Direct Investment (FDI) towards the development of the Nigerian economy can never be over emphasized. This is why Omenma (2009:46) opined: "This is no gainsaying the fact that no man and by extension no state is an Island". This means that states need the relationship and partnership of one another to pursue development goals but the quest for foreign direct investment in Nigeria has been compromised by the level of insecurity in the country. The Nigerian government long before now understands the importance to woo foreign investors. And governments being aware of the limitation and incapability of the local investors wasted no time to vigorously and financially make provision for the injection of foreign capital in form of investments in the country. This it did through the use of shuttle diplomacy. This was protected and facilitated by the country's confidence in its new found democracy which most foreign firms have pointed out as the basis for investigation.

The Nation Newspaper (2013:3) reported about the activities of Boko Haram thus: Borno and neighbouring Yobe State – the epicenter of the activities of the sect – have been crippled economically. Thousands of people have died in the sect's bloody campaign. It must be noted that Boko Haram have not only led to closure and or abandonment of people's business activities within affected region but also led to migration of people from the affected Region as well as once led to reduction of people's patronage of product from Northern Region because of rumour that member of Boko Haram are planning to send poisonous product from their region to other parts of Nigeria. No wonder Mr Umar Ibrahim Yakubu (Leadership Newspaper: 2012) opined thus in respect of Boko Haram: "we discovered that 97 per cent of businesses were negatively affected by the security problem. Some of them had to close down, some of them had to retrench their workers, and others had to cut down in the number of hours of operation".

Also the insurgencies of Boko Haram have reduced drastically; government derivation from the affected region due to restiveness in those places as well as reduced investment and growth of business in the affected places without excluding government executed project.

No wonder 2011 World Investment Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reported that lull in business activities caused by insecurity in Kano State alone has cost the Nigerian economy N1.3trillion ($6 billion) as a result of attacks by the Boko Haram group. It was further reported that the report monitored on the Voice of America (VoA) also shown that Centre for Research and Documentation in Kano attributed the development to a drop in earnings for nearly all businesses in the state (Leadership Newspaper: 2012). In the area of diplomatic relations, Boko Haram in Nigeria has negatively affected the relationship between Nigeria and other Nations of the world because of bombing coupled with kidnapping and hostage taking with or without demand for ransom; particularly of alien which have resulted to demised of some of them and have greatly been an object of disturb not only to Nigeria but include International Community. It could be recollected that few years ago, United State of America warned her nationals not to go to some states in Nigeria without forgetting that United Nation have once include Nigeria in watching list of terrorist in the World which was later removed. Also it is once reported that there are strong indications that Nigeria may be blacklisted by international anti-money laundering watchdogs called Financial Action Task Force (FATF) over its inability to track the source of funds of Boko Haram and curb terrorism financing in general (Odidison Omankhanlen and Johnson Babajide: 2012).

In all, terrorism impedes development in the following ways as summarized by Ewetan and Urhie (2014):

- Social dislocation and population displacement
- Social tensions and new pattern of settlements which encourages Muslins/Christians or members of an ethnic group moving to Muslim/Christian dominated enclaves.
- Heightens citizenship question which entrenches hostility between "indigenes" and "settlers".
- Dislocation and disruption of family and communal life.
- General atmosphere of mistrust, fear, anxiety and frenzy
- Dehumanization of women, children, and men especially in areas where rape, child abuse and neglect are used as instruments of war.
- Deepening of hunger and poverty in the polity.
- Discourages local and foreign investment as it makes investment unattractive to business people.
- Halts business operations during period of violence and outright closure of many enterprises in the areas or zones where incidence of insecurity is rife and are on daily occurrence.
- Increases security spending by business organizations and governments.
- Migration of people from area or region where there is prevalence of insecurity.

Out of the Woods: Solutions to Terrorism in Nigeria

Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism involves those efforts a nation uses to combat or counteract terrorist activity. Counterterrorist campaigns take place on many levels, often involving multifaceted military surveillance and attack, diplomatic efforts, economic strategy, and law enforcement and intellectual tactics. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the concept of counterterrorism took on added meaning. A unique, worldwide campaign involving many countries around the world joined together to fight a slippery foe: those terrorist groups that might threaten international stability and the interests of democratic nations (Misiroglu, 2003). As opined by Misiroglu (2003), because the enemy is not one particular country, but rather a somewhat elusive entity, political scientists have likened the war on terrorism in some respects to cold war which requires being fought at home and abroad through multiple operations, including diplomatic, financial, investigative, humanitarian, and homeland security efforts. With terrorism being regarded as cold war, continuous pressure from the world will cause the collapse of terrorism just as continuous pressure from many nations caused communism to collapse from within.

From a diplomatic point of view, the United Nations Security Council unanimously enacted a binding resolution requiring all member countries to pursue terrorists and those who support them, financially or otherwise. Nineteen NATO nations invoked Article V declaring an attack on one as an attack on all, and the Organization of American States invoked the Rio Treaty, obligating signatories to consider an attack against any member as an attack against all. Financially, the United States and other nations have frozen millions of dollars in assets belonging to the Taliban, bin Laden, and the Al Qaeda network. More than 150 countries have joined the effort to disrupt terrorist assets. On an investigative front, counterterrorist operations have been intensified with more than 200 intelligence and security services worldwide.

The Meghalaya Model

As put forward by Kharbhih (2010), the Meghalaya model is a multi-sector approach involving government, law enforcement, judiciary and civil society organizations that creates a comprehensive framework for combating trafficking in North East Asia in 1999 under the five "Ps" Prevention, Protection, Policing, Press and Prosecution. Meghalaya Model is designed to track and rescue trafficked children in North East Asia; to facilitate rehabilitation, and making sure that survivors do not get re-trafficked. It also provides families with livelihood alternatives; provides evidence to prosecute offenders; and raises awareness through the media. The process of Meghalaya Model is the five "Rs" Reporting, Rescue, Rehabilitation, Repatriation and Re-education. Omale (2013) argues that these activities that are pillars of the Meghalaya model to counter human trafficking are relevant to counter terrorism as they could fight the supply of terrorists, supply of mercenaries for terrorism, and the demand for terrorist networks. This is imperative because, despite international agreements and a plethora of national laws on counter terrorism, the issue remains one of the fastest growing criminal violence in the world. Its proliferation is due to its cross border nature and thus requires cooperation and collaboration between states, if it is to be tackled effectively. However, throughout the world often counter terrorism initiatives have failed to incorporate all relevant stakeholders. Hence, the Meghalaya Model though originally designed to track and rescue trafficked children could be adopted or adapted to counter terrorism in Nigeria; as there are insinuations of mercenaries and conscripted fighters for Boko Haram terrorists. And with the porous nature of Nigerian borders and the rate of human trafficking in the country, these mercenaries and conscripted fighters could be trafficked victims from neigbouring countries. This model is relevant to counter terrorism in Nigeria because through a collaborative and far-reaching security network of stakeholders in counter terrorism and human trafficking (Security and Intelligence Agencies, NAPTIP, the media, Civil Society and NGOs), terrorists, mercenaries and terror suspects are more likely to be arrested, and will face prosecution (Omale, 2013).

Youth Empowerment

The link between job creation and peace building has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General's approval of the 'UN Policy for Post- Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation And Reintegration' in 2008 and more recently by the ILO's 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in Post- Conflict (UN, 2009; ILO, 2010). Hence, Omale (2013) argues that the evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive armed conflict or Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy is strong: some government-led initiatives in countries that experience high levels of armed violence (such as Brazil and South Africa) are good examples. So emphasis on youth Anti Violence Response (AVR) strategy should be based on 'holistic', 'comprehensive' and 'integrated' approaches that go beyond simply addressing a lack of economic opportunities, but seek to address the more complex array of factors (like belief system, religious, political and ethnic fundamentalism) that make youth entrepreneurs of violence rather than peace-seeds. This is imperative because Omale argues that, if youth involvement in terrorism is becoming a real threat, then the primary step is to try to understand the phenomena of increase, and the causes of such criminal deviance.

Institutional and Capacity Building

The foundation of good governance is built on the rule of law; equality and fairness. When individuals and nations understand that all created beings irrespective of their race, religion, culture, sex etc. are equal before God, then exploitation, oppression, intimidation, suppression and others alike will be eliminated. It must be noted that terrorism triumph in areas where people are mostly oppressed, suppressed and exploited. These are the fuel needed to fan the embers of terrorism. In the world today democracy affords nations the opportunity to rule by democratic principles and standard that ensures a peaceful co-existence. This must be imbibed in Nigeria, so that the citizens will feel and see democracy in practice. In policy reforms, it would be critical for government to adapt to a new environment in consideration to terrorists modes and strategic changes in the approach and attacks. The National Grand strategy module on the vision 2020 should be well put on the right course. Government agenda in tackling the developmental issues should be prioritized, based on the short and long term needs of the country. Our developmental indices should indicate an upward movement across all aspects of our socio-economic imperatives. There are no industries, no power to sustain cottage industries, no road to areas of need, no water (safe) is rocketing astronomically and poverty is written on the faces of the people. Terrorism cannot be fought when those things that caused them are left visibly begging to be solved.

The Presidential task force on terrorism should be equipped in such a way that it should have the capability of analyzing intelligence and take pro-active or preventive measures to contain any threat. There is much hatred, sentiment and fear in the country, government strategic plans should be able to create an atmosphere of confidence in the governance. The security personnel must be trained in order to acquire the necessary skill to operate whatever equipment the government may provide for unity. The intelligence operations of gathering, dissemination, direction and control need to be integrated and harmonized in a central operating unit. In doing this, there will be a central command. There will be no lapses or operational bottlenecks or unnecessary bureaucratic controls relating to information sharing and dissemination. Government must create a synergy where all security agencies can rally round for a common goal (Chinwokwu, 2013).

Conclusion

The world we live is seriously under threat; domestic and international threat perpetuated on the basis of frustration, aggression, marginalization, ideology and such other excuses by terrorists, otherwise enemies of development. Without trivializing the grievances of the aggrieved parties, it is instructive to note that their perceived-misalignment does not absolve them of escalating violence and demeaning the political process but instead attracts the wrath of the government that will stop at nothing to crush such anomaly. To be sure, terrorism must be seen for exactly what it is- a threat to national security and development. The paper has made a case that terrorism is an impediment to development in Nigeria and has increased violation of human rights whilst deepening insecurity in the society. The social ills experienced in Nigeria are both a means and end to terrorism in Nigeria, thus to ensure sustainable development and national security in Nigeria, it is imperative that terrorism is nipped in the bud. Cushioning the adverse effects of terrorism will surely pave way for a meaningful, systematic, holistic and responsible development which will be co-operative, responsive and co-responsible in its entirety.

Although, the government in Nigeria has, at different times adopted different approaches to combat terrorism. Given the complexity of the security situation in Nigeria, blended with the economic, political and social strife, projects and programmes designed to counter terrorism should be built around community resilience against terrorism, enhance cooperation among law enforcement agencies and strengthening judicial institutions. Hence strategy and the importance of collective efforts to counter terrorism in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected Nigeria have become imperative (Omale, 2013). It is in view of this that the paper advocates for counter-terrorism strategy as submitted by Nchi (2013):

1. Effective network for intelligence gathering and analysis;
2. Strategic surveillance aimed at dictating membership, motivation, and operational modalities of the sect;
3. Clinical investigation and prognostication of the socio-psychological and socio-economic currents that underlie the emergence, growth and sustenance of the sect and its activities;
4. Identifying and foreclosing sources of inspiration, funding and recruitment to the sect;
5. Proactive engagement of civil society stakeholders in the fight against the sect; and
6. Tactical exploration of the diplomatic option in an attempt to come to terms with legitimate (if any) grievances of the sect.

Indeed, curtailing terrorism in Nigeria should top the agenda of the government in the drive towards national security and development, after all, without peace, little can be achieved in the desecrated Boko Haram-infested states and the Niger-Delta militant-pipe-bombing-regions, hence, no peace, no security and/or development.

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